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issues. The appellate court quickly dispensed with the trespass claim,
noting that as a member of the association, Cardon had authorization
to access the property in question.
The remaining issue was the allocation of the riparian rights to the
canal. The court defined riparian rights as vested property rights that
arise out of ownership of land bounded or traversed by navigable water. The court explained that a riparian owner has a qualified property right in the water frontage belonging, by nature, to his land. The
chief advantage growing out of the appurtenant estate in the submerged land was the right of access over an extension of waterfronts to
navigable water, and the right to construct wharfs, piers or landings.
The court first examined the validity of each party's property
rights. Both parties produced valid deeds which conveyed the respective properties with all riparian rights attached. Furthermore, both
deeds originated from a common source of title. The court then
turned to the general rules of apportionment of disputed riparian
rights. Normally, such apportionment involved drawing a line along
the channel in front of the properties, then drawing a line perpendicular to the line of the channel so that it intersects with the shore at
the point the upland property line meets the water's edge. However,
this rule applied to situations in which the shoreline was substantially
straight, whereas the shoreline in question was essentially a right angle.
The court noted an absence of controlling precedent, and evaluated the rules from nearby jurisdictions. The court recognized two
such methods of allocation, the "angle bisection formula" and the
"reasonable use" test. The court concluded that where the shoreline
was at a right angle, such as the Canal's shoreline, the "reasonable use"
test was the most equitable method of determining the owners' rights.
According to the test, the owners' rights depend on a rule of reasonableness, and must be restricted so as not to interfere with the correlative rights of other owners. As a reasonableness inquiry, the question
was one of fact for the jury, rendering summary judgment inappropriate.
Stephen Lawler

NORTH DAKOTA
Mougey Farms v. Kaspari, 579 N.W.2d 583 (N.D. 1998) (holding the
parties' written easement and lease expressed an intent contrary to the
creation of an easement implied from a preexisting use or an easement by necessity, and that partitioning the underground irrigation
system was not in error because the parties' written easement identified the ownership rights).
In 1982, the State Engineer of North Dakota issued the Kasparis a
conditional water permit requiring beneficial use of the water before
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August of 1985. Mougey agreed to help the Kasparis develop the water
right, and by 1984 Mougey operated an above ground irrigation system
on the Kasparis' land. Subsequently, the parties agreed to install an
underground irrigation system to service both the Kasparis' and
Mougey's land with Mougey paying additional rent for the irrigation
equipment financed by the Kasparis. It was also agreed that Mougey
would receive water rights for its land. The State Engineer approved a
transfer of 13 acres of water permit from the Kasparis' land to
Mougey's land.
In 1985 the parties entered into a ten year lease in which Mougey
agreed to pay a certain amount for the cost of pipe and wire for the irrigation system, and to pay additional rent for the purpose of buying
the irrigation system from the Kasparis. The parties also exercised a
written easement allowing Mougey to run water through the irrigation
system on the Kasparis' land to its land. The easement also apportioned ownership of the irrigation system, and specified that it would
terminate if Mougey no longer leased the Kasparis' land. In 1987, the
parties entered into a new ten year lease where Mougey would make
payments directly to the Kasparis' bank for the irrigation equipment.
In 1996, the Kasparis informed Mougey the lease would not be renewed, and that Mougey could not continue to pump water through
the irrigation system to its land.
Mougey sued, claiming that it could continue to pump water across
the Kasparis' land under an implied easement, an easement by necessity, or an easement of condemnation. It also sought reformation of
the 1987 lease and partition of the irrigation system. Mougey appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing its
easement claim, and the Kasparis cross-appealed the court's decision
reforming the lease and partitioning the irrigation system.
The North Dakota Supreme Court, in addressing Mougey's easement claim, recognized two types of implied easements, an easement
implied from a preexisting use and an easement by necessity. Mougey
asserted that an implied easement existed because water rights were
appurtenant to the real estate, and the Kasparis granted an implied
easement to pump water across their land. After defining the categories of implied easements, the court stated "the express grant of an
easement negates an implied easement." Here, the parties had a written, express easement. Therefore, a contract analysis was appropriate
to determine that the parties' express written intent sought termination of the easement if Mougey no longer leased the Kasparis' land.
The supreme court also found summary judgment of Mougey's
eminent domain claim for an easement to pump water across the Kasparis' land in error. The court concluded that a private person was allowed to exercise such a claim, under North Dakota law, so long as
that person is acquiring for "a public use any property or rights existing when found necessary for the application of water to beneficial
uses." The court stated that according to Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361,
each state's local conditions play an important role in deciding if a
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proposed taking to facilitate use of water is for public use. Consistent
with North Dakota law, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded
that irrigation of farmland satisfied the pubic use requirement so long
as it is under a perfected water permit issued by the State Engineer.
The supreme court also found that the easement identified the
parties' ownership rights with respect to the irrigation equipment.
Thus, the trial court was correct in partitioning the irrigation system
pursuant to the parties' intent.
As for Mougey's reformation claim, the supreme court found that
Mougey's payments to the Kasparis' bank were for the actual cost of
the irrigation system. The actual cost of the irrigation system was less
than the actual loan taken out by the Kasparis to buy the equipment.
The court upheld the use of extrinsic evidence to establish the reformation claim and held that the claim was not barred by the statute of
limitations because Mougey had no reason to know he was being overcharged until 1993. Therefore, Mougey's eminent domain claim was
remanded and the remainder of the trial court's judgment was affirmed.
Anna Litaker

OHIO
Rivers Unlimited, Inc. v. Schregardus, 685 N.E.2d 603 (Ohio Misc.
1997) (holding that Ohio's antidegradation statute did not violate the
Ohio Constitution's one-subject rule, but did violate the U.S. Constitution's supremacy and commerce clauses).
Plaintiff and Defendant both filed cross-motions for summary
judgment in the Ohio Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff, Rivers Unlimited, Inc., sought judgment declaring that Ohio's antidegradation
statute violated the Ohio Constitution's "one-subject rule" and the
Federal Constitution's commerce and supremacy clauses. Defendant,
Schregardus, sought to uphold Ohio's antidegradation statute. The
court granted the Defendant's motion holding that the state antidegradation statute did not violate the "one-subject rule." Conversely,
the court granted the Plaintiffs motion holding that the antidegradation statute conflicted with the Clean Water Act ("CWA"); thus, the
statute violated the Federal Constitution's supremacy and commerce
clauses.
The Ohio Constitution's one-subject rule precludes political minorities from combining their provisions into a single bill to obtain a
majority vote required for the bill's passage, and precludes a person
from attaching a provision to a bill anticipated to pass so that the provision will also pass. In order to attach a provision, the bill and the
provision must share a common purpose or relationship. However, if
the court finds that semantic and contextual analysis of the documents
constituted a manifestly gross and fraudulent violation of the rule, the

